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1898: The Onset of America's Troubled Asian Century

Eighteen ninety-eight was a watershed in American engagement in Asia. The acquisition of territory spanning the Pacific, the determination to secure an influence equal to the already well-entrenched Europeans, and the underlying conviction that Asia was a stage for the American drama supplied momentum for a century of deep U.S. political and military involvement in the region. At times tempestuous and traumatic, that involvement was marked by two distinct cycles. The first began with the enthusiasm of 1898, but soon began to ebb when stubborn Filipino resistance fueled heated political debate over whether the champion of liberty had lost its way. That debate rapidly gave way to amnesia as American forces secured control of the Philippines. (Who recalls today that U.S. soldiers fought a war against guerrillas in Asia long before Vietnam?) With Congress and American proconsuls bogged down in the wearisome details of colonial administration, commentators who bothered to look back to 1898 began to depict the takeover of the Philippines as something of an aberration for the champion of liberty. By the 1930s it was easy to see something delusional in the belief that the United States could bring order and progress to a conflict-ridden China or resist Japanese claims to regional influence (1).

The Japanese military advance—capped by the attack on Pearl Harbor—challenged this critical, aloof appraisal. By the end of the Pacific War, the United States was dominant throughout much of the region and about to set off on a new bout of activism—leading the Philippines on the last step toward independence, sustaining a victorious but wounded ally in China, creating an anti-communist bastion in South Korea, and subjecting Japan to a reformist occupation. Intensified by Cold War fears of communist expansion, this vision of a U.S. mission in Asia helped sustain Americans through the vicissitudes of a revolution in China, a war in Korea, and a difficult decision to intervene in Vietnam. When that intervention went sour in the late 1960s, the pendulum swung dramatically the other way—toward searching self-criticism. The turn-of-the-century misadventure in the Philippines began to look like a dress rehearsal for Vietnam. In both cases, it now seemed, a racist world view and a fear that other powers would exploit U.S. passivity condemned American forces to a dirty war against a nationalist movement (2). By the late 1970s U.S. engagement in Asia seemed at best misguided and at worst a sustained exercise in imperial hubris. Asia had put Americans on the defensive, and it kept them there.

What accounts for the American initiatives that inaugurated this Pacific era, and why did an enterprise launched with such confidence end up battered by national doubts and division? The hindsight afforded by a centenary and a rich scholarly literature provides some helpful insights (3).

* * *

An important part of the answer to these questions lies on the American side of the story. Establishing an advanced position in the Pacific represented a fateful triumph over restraints that had until 1898 severely circumscribed American interests in the region. The

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earlier acquisition of coaling stations (Midway in 1867, Pago Pago in 1878, and Pearl Harbor in 1887) foreshadowed a major Asian commitment. United States naval expeditions had prowled the western Pacific but accomplished little aside from opening Japan and Korea to outside contact so that other powers could go rushing in. American diplomats in Asia tried to keep up with their European colleagues but were regularly muscled aside. Yet even in the 1880s and 1890s—as European imperial rivalries and expansionist pressures in the United States quickened—countervailing political forces at home still served as a brake on overseas projects. Trade groups and missionary organizations spoke out forcefully in support of profit and proselytizing in Asia. But against these voices for engagement was pitted a wide array of political forces, including a strong nativist movement on the West Coast that dismissed closer contacts with Asia as a source not of benefit but of contamination.

The war with Spain ignited nationalist sentiments that temporarily overwhelmed doubts about trans-Pacific engagements. On 1 May 1898 the U.S. achieved a resounding American victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Two months later the McKinley administration pushed Hawaii's annexation through Congress. Madrid's surrender in August set the stage for the formal decision to acquire the Philippines and Guam. The peace terms formalizing these two acquisitions won narrow Senate approval in early February 1899. During 1898 and 1899, Secretary of State John Hay issued two open-door notes that sought to give the U.S. access to China on an equal basis with other powers. Some observers began to think that American influence was essential to China's progress and that cultivating this influence was a major facet of the U.S. future as a Pacific power.

Taken together, these initiatives registered a growing conviction that the United States had an important role to play in Asia. McKinley said so in more and more emphatic terms as he edged toward a decision on Philippine annexation. In a speech in Iowa in October 1898, he observed cautiously, "Territory sometimes comes to us when we go to war in a holy cause, and whenever it does the banner of liberty will float over it and bring, I trust, the blessings and benefits to all peoples." Two months later speaking publicly in Atlanta, he announced the planting of the American flag "in two hemispheres" in the name "of liberty and law, of peace and progress." Defiant, he asked, "Who will haul it down?" Finally, in Boston in February 1899, following the successful Senate treaty fight, the advocate of "benevolent assimilation" predicted that Filipinos "shall for ages hence bless the American republic because it emancipated and redeemed their fatherland, and set them in the pathway of the world's best civilization" (4).

Political elites played a critical role in promoting Philippines annexation as part of a broader vision of a new Pacific era. McKinley, long derided for having a backbone like a chocolate eclair, has in recent decades assumed a pivotal place in our understanding of this elite project. Historians now agree that he was a strong figure whose practices in office arguably establish him as the first modern president. He skillfully shaped public opinion through the new mass press, exploited new technologies (telegraph, telephone, and train) to communicate his views and control events during war and in peacemaking, and thus significantly expanded the powers of his office. Forceful use of the resources at his disposal enabled a man who had never ventured beyond his country's borders to acquire the rudiments of an empire (5).

> Who recalls today that U.S. soldiers fought a war against guerrillas in Asia long before Vietnam?

It has proven easier to agree on McKinley's role than to nail down his motives. Some historians have contended that the president and his associates faced economic and social pressures that were by the 1890s destabilizing an increasingly industrial and urban nation. Policymakers thought that an expansionist foreign policy would calm the crisis at home by securing markets and diverting attention abroad. Other historians have stressed a nationalist ideology and deep cultural patterns in explaining why McKinley acted and how he elicited broad support; leaders shared with the public a nationalism buoyed by a record of astounding success. One source of this confidence was the seemingly irresistible process of continental expansion that had in turn legitimized an ideology of manifest destiny and racial superiority. Americans could boast of their relentless advance across a continent, pushing aside European territorial claims and overriding indigenous opposition. Another source of nationalism was dramatic population and economic growth. By the 1890s a once small, weak country stood on a par with the other major powers. A third source was the vigor of a political system that had withstood a civil war and preserved fragile republican ideals. Nineteenth-century school texts, sermons, public exhibitions, newspaper editorials, and popular novels retold this success story and prepared the way for trans-Pacific initiatives by depicting Asians as backward but redeemable and treating the American civilizing mission as one without geographical bounds. The resulting public conception of the world and the American role in it helped create the environment that made McKinley's activist policy possible (6).

But we need to extend our vision a bit beyond 1898 if we are to assimilate the events of that year into the broader patterns that would define the American century in Asia. McKinley's America would quickly learn, as would later generations, that high hopes and brave projects inspired by war could quickly go bad, and a stake in Asia

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assumed with confidence and popular support could easily become a source of public discord and a thorn in the side of policymakers.

The Philippines, the centerpiece of the U.S. initiative in Asia, became almost at once a bone of contention. McKinley's move toward annexation in the fall of 1898 galvanized anti-expansionist groups. The resulting protest movement was a diverse coalition acting out of a range of motives familiar from earlier debates. Southern Democrats recoiled before Republican initiatives that strengthened the federal government relative to the states and that might bring people of color within the union. Fiscal conservatives and defenders of simple republican government feared costly, corrupting foreign adventures sure to invite abuses of power, while defenders of liberty rallied against the betrayal of fundamental national values. In addition, women's organizations denounced colonial oppression of a foreign people. These objections took on greater force beginning in 1899, when organized Filipino resistance gave the lie to American notions of "native" plasticity and gratitude. Congress, the public, and even those in charge in the archipelago found that fighting guerrillas was not just costly; it also led to atrocities committed by U.S. troops. Public outrage and Congressional hearings on the excesses associated with military pacification highlighted for some the difficulties of uplift and for others McKinley's shocking betrayal of national ideals (7).

Although McKinley's critics hoped to make the presidential election of 1900 a referendum on imperialism, the president handily won reelection after a campaign governed largely by other issues. But by then the agents of empire had already gotten the message sent by guerrillas in the Philippines and dissenters at home. They did not decamp, but they did scale back their goals and struck a bargain with Filipino leaders who were themselves unhappy with the immediate costs and long-term viability of resistance. This bargain conceded to the United States immediate colonial control. In return, the islands' landed elite won a promise for their country's ultimate independence and for their own increasing participation in governance. This bargain also, as it turned out, lent U.S. sanction to a Filipino social and economic order marked by one of the widest gaps between the privileged and the poor anywhere in the world.

While the bargain preserved the form of American tutelage and saved face for those who had dreamed of making the islands an advanced base for free men and free markets, it was in substance a retreat from the dreams of regeneration and uplift inspired by 1898. Already in its first years the U.S. colonial administration was failing in its commitment to develop the economy, upgrade basic education, and democratize the political system in preparation for independence. While American performance as a reformer fell far short of its promise, the Philippines itself turned into a point of strategic vulnerability and a source of competition for American farmers (8).

These developments in the Philippines defined some of the main patterns of the coming Asian century. American colonialism there began as a project of nation-building attempted in collaboration with indigenous elites amenable to American control but attached to their own goals. In this sense the Philippines foreshadowed the American experience in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. Once launched, the Philippines project suffered a steady loss of elite and public support, and in that sense it stands as a dress rehearsal for the domestic travail that followed commitments in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1965.

The pattern of American hopes dashed or at least dimmed after 1898 extends from the Philippines to the two major Asian powers of the time. China and Japan played a critical role in frustrating American pretensions. To think of 1898-1899 as a purely American moment and Asia as merely a stage for an American drama is to repeat the mistake of McKinley and Hay. Far from being blank slates on which Americans were to write, Asians had their own dreams, and their dogged attachment to those dreams helped disabuse Americans of the idea of a cheap or easy Asian imperium.

Alongside the Filipino elites, Chinese and Japanese state-builders frustrated Americans not just in the immediate wake of 1898 but throughout the century. In both of these Asian countries "wealth and power" figured prominently as the prime national objective, and both prized the state as the indispensable agent for realizing this goal. To the puzzlement of Americans, this statist political culture stressed not open debate but rather broad acceptance of an official socio-political orthodoxy, and it saw society not as a collection of competing self-interested units but rather as a mutually dependent, tightly linked, hierarchically arranged organism. In other words, neither country was ready to accept American leadership or follow the script Americans had prepared for the new Pacific era.

In China neither of the central goals of American policy—promoting reforms to save the empire and imposing restraints on other powers—proved easy. The refusal of the Chinese to play the role of good students that American expansionists had assigned them would prove a special source of frustration. Hardly had Hay begun to articulate his open-door doctrine than he encountered a challenge from a completely unexpected quarter—a popular nativist movement that sprang up in North China's Shandong province in 1899. Washington watched incredulous and helpless as Boxer bands took hold in the countryside, attacked foreign missionaries and their converts, and finally swept along an imperial court seething over foreign demands. With Boxer bands and sympathetic imperial forces dominating the capital, McKinley decided to defend fresh American claims as a Pacific power. In mid-1900 he launched his second major American military intervention in the region. A U.S. force of some four thousand joined other foreign troops in North China in taking Beijing, quelling the Boxers, scouring the countryside, and bringing the ruling dynasty to account (9).

This exercise in coalition warfare ended a hollow victory. The offending Qing dynasty survived, and its officials used their last decade in power to press for restoring central authority and resources. To American consternation this reform program took a distinctly nationalist direction, including a campaign to recover rights and privileges enjoyed by Americans and others foreigners. On the other hand, reform did not arrest the political fragmentation of China. The fall of the dynasty in 1912 and its replacement by a weak republican government left China still more vulnerable to foreign pressure. But Chinese nationalists continued the campaign to rewrite the terms of Sino-foreign relations, and the most prominent leader of Republican China, Chiang Kai-shek, resumed the task of state regeneration in the

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late 1920s and 1930s. Finally, Mao Zedong's Communist Party took up the burden of state building in 1949. That party's devotion to creating a strong state with a pronounced anti-imperialist program makes it seem in historical perspective part of a well-established pattern rather than a revolutionary break with the past, and the achievements of the People's Republic confirmed the importance of a strong state in China's pursuit of prosperity and territorial integrity and security. This was hardly the outcome that Americans intent on a "special relationship" with China had in mind (10).

But in fact that special relationship had eroded rapidly from the turn of the century, in the thinking of China's foreign affairs experts. Earlier, they had seen the United States as a potential diplomatic counterweight against the more aggressive powers and as a developmental model, but first-hand contact tarnished this view. Diplomats and other official visitors to the United States reported mistreatment of Chinese immigrants and African Americans. They viewed the American political system as a crude, contentious, and tumultuous electoral process in which unprincipled factions wrangled, bought their way to power, and distributed the spoils of office. Meiji Japan and the constitutional monarchies of Europe seemed in the end more appropriate models for China. The conquest of the Philippines, a small weak country whose plight many Chinese identified with, carried a particularly strong symbolic charge. Politically engaged Chinese pondered the meaning of American expansion across the Pacific. While some thought that a more assertive United States might become a valuable strategic partner, others saw it as dangerous and wondered if the dynamism of the American economy did not explain this more aggressive course. A proto-Leninist explanation of American expansion in the Pacific as the product of a maturing capitalist system would win an ever wider audience and become orthodoxy after 1949 (11).

The Japanese were the third set of Asian students whose deportment fell short of American expectations. Their country presented a very different case—a state in the midst of creating an empire rather than struggling to preserve one. Yet as in China, issues of state power dominated the political agenda and shaped perceptions of the United States. In Japan, the process of state-building was already far advanced by 1898. Beginning in 1868, reformers sponsoring the restoration of the Meiji emperor had sought to preserve Japan's independence in the face of relentless foreign pressure and technological and military superiority. The Meiji oligarchs replaced a feudal political system with a popular centralized state, fielded a professional armed forces, promoted economic development and mass education, and above all derived its legiti-

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The Pasig River, Manila. (*The Autobiography of George Dewey, Admiral of the Navy* [New York: Charles Scribner@s Sons, 1913], 203.)

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macy from the imperial institution. Their success could soon be seen in the first sprouts of industry, treaty revision establishing formal equality with the Western powers, the deployment of new military and naval forces to create an embryonic empire at China's expense, and a readiness to participate in the European alliance system (12).

Before 1898 the United States figured as a model for these statist ambitions. But as in the Chinese case, close inspection revealed that the United States was not a perfect model. Japanese visitors saw a culture shockingly at odds with core Confucian values; they noted the chaos of democracy, unrestrained individualism, an indifference to social ritual, and gender roles that gave women far too public a place. The American initiatives of 1898 added to these negative features. The acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines and enthusiastic declarations on American destiny in the Pacific directly challenged Japan's future role as a regional power (13).

Americans fully reciprocated Japan's suspicions. The sweeping reforms launched in 1868 seemed to American observers to place Japan on the path of Western development. But already by the latter part of the 1890s Japan's increasingly assertive role in the region was raising some question as to whether it would evolve into an advanced, peaceful, civilized power. Following the thrashing of China in 1894-1895, Japan took Taiwan and demanded a sphere of influence in the adjacent mainland province of Fujian. The seeds of doubt among Americans, planted by these acts of Japanese aggrandizement, flowered after Japan's dramatic victory over Russia in 1905. The spectacle of "Orientals" drubbing Europeans did as much to shake Americans as Japan's ensuing takeover of Korea and its consolidation of control in the southern part of China's northeast territories. Japan appeared increasingly deviant: westernization was making Japan stronger yet not eradicating its feudal, militaristic outlook.

Less than a decade after the first open-door note, the American claim as a Pacific power had run up against the reality of an unruly China and a Japan bent on building its influence in the region. The outcome was disarray in U.S. policy. Once in the White House, that arch-expansionist Theodore Roosevelt decided to accommodate Japanese influence in northeast Asia, and he recognized that Japanese naval power had made the Philippines a strategic liability ("our heel of Achilles," in his memorable phrase). Having embraced a more modest version of America's Pacific century, Roosevelt in 1909 chided his successor, William Howard Taft, for a seeming willingness to defend the open door in China even at the risk of war with Japan. Taft's secretary of state, Philander C. Knox, replied in terms that echoed the strong sense of Pacific destiny spawned by 1898. He was determined to contest Japanese pretensions to regional hegemony, to promote American economic and cultural influence in China, and even to vindicate Hay's commitment to defend China's political integrity. Knox would not renounce the "traditional" open-door policy or even rule out war with Japan in defense of that policy. But Knox was out of touch with U.S. business and bankers. They had scaled back their expectations for the China market and looked instead to Japan as the most promising market and the strongest force for regional economic development.

These divisions over how to define and defend the American stake in Asia would not disappear. Throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and into the early Cold War, Americans debated how far to become involved in China and the rest of Asia. The "who-lost-China" debate of the late 1940s as well as the controversies over limited war in Korea and Vietnam were thus expressions of the long-term difficulties that 1898 helped get the country into.

* * *

Today on the centenary of 1898, Americans are perhaps poised to write *finis* to one era of trans-Pacific relations. We are already engaged in negotiating the terms of a new era. The United States has abandoned its Philippines bases and its Filipino clients. American preferences regularly run up against the wishes of the region's two leading powers. Japan, the leader of the world's most economically dynamic region, and a fast-developing, increasingly confident China

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have both challenged U.S. dominance in recent years. The United States has responded to this Asian revival in part by seeking out cooperation on economic and environmental issues. Americans may at last be ready to embrace what was never possible over the last hundred years—a relationship approaching equality for a new Pacific century.

Yet American dreams of dominion and uplift that took form in 1898 when Asia was poor and weak show signs of persisting a hundred years later. We still tell China how to handle the take-over of Hong Kong, seek to manage the strategic balance on the Korean peninsula, instruct Japan on the proper relationship between savings and consumption, champion American-style political rights throughout the region, and scapegoat Asians for the ills of our corrupting system of campaign fund-raising. There is a case to be made that Americans remain anchored psychologically to 1898 and that patterns from the century will continue at least into the coming decades.

Americans, caught between an Asian assertiveness that has shaken our self-confidence and a time-honored faith in the universal meaning of American values, are in the midst of making a fateful choice. That choice is not between involvement in Asia or isolation. A century and more of contacts have woven a complex web of ties impossible to ignore or sweep aside. The choice is rather between bringing the century opened by 1898 to a definitive close or perpetuating dreams of Pacific dominion that came to full flower that year. Wherever our Asian relationship is headed, we will be best served by remembering that Asians will have a lot to say about the future of their region and that any relationship that ignores this simple point is bound for trouble. ❑

Endnotes

1. Dorothy Borg, comp., *Historians and American Far Eastern Policy* (New York: Columbia University East Asian Institute, 1966).
2. A major wave of scholarship on the United States and the Philippines developed under the shadow of the Vietnam War and was preoccupied with parallels between the two cases. See notably Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Beisner, "1898 and 1968: The Anti-Imperialists and the Doves," *Political Science Quarterly* 85 (1970): 186-216; Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Stuart C. Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Glenn A. May, "Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902," *Pacific Historical Review* 52 (1983): 353-77; Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).
3. This literature has been the subject of major, periodic reviews, beginning with Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr., eds., *American-East Asian Relations: A Survey* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); followed by Warren I. Cohen, ed., *New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); and Cohen, ed., *Pacific Passage: The Study of American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). For notable efforts at popular synthesis intended to put the U.S. role in Asia in broad context, see the materials created as part of *The Pacific Century Project in 1992: a ten-part video and two texts* (one by Frank Gibney and the other by Mark Borthwick).
4. McKinley quoted in Lewis L. Gould, *The Spanish-American War and President McKinley* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1982), 104, 111, 119.
5. Margaret Leech, *In the Days of McKinley* (New York: Harper, 1959), anticipated the favorable picture of a vigorous, shrewd policymaker. It was further developed in "new left" works such as Walter

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Sugar plantation pumping station, Hawaii. (*Harper@s Pictorial History of the War with Spain* [New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1899], 492.)

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LaFeber's *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), but also embraced by historians with other interpretive tendencies including notably Gould, *The Spanish-American War and President McKinley*; and John L. Offner, *An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895-1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

6. Works suggesting links between a foreign policy of expansion and pressures within late-nineteenth-century American society include notably Richard Hofstadter's psychic crisis thesis in "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," in *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, ed. Hofstadter (New York: Knopf, 1965), 145-87; Thomas J. McCormick, *China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967); Walter LaFeber, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Gail Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Ruth Miller Elson, *Guardians of Tradition: American Schoolbooks of the Nineteenth Century* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964); Robert W. Rydell, *All the World's a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Amy Kaplan, "Romancing the Empire: The Embodiment of American Masculinity in the Popular Historical Novels of the 1890s," *American Literary History* 2 (Winter 1990): 659-90; Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
7. In addition to Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, see Fred H. Harrington's still useful "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 22 (September 1935): 211-30; Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," *Journal of Southern History* 24 (August 1958): 319-31; E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); Judith Papachristou, "American Women and Foreign Policy, 1989-1905," *Diplomatic History* 14 (Fall 1990): 493-509.
8. The idea of a bargain between elite Filipino collaborators and American proconsuls and the consequences of that bargain for the twentieth-century Philippines is developed in brief compass by Peter Stanley in James C. Thomson, Jr., et al., *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), chaps. 8 and 19. It is more fully elaborated in Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). See also Glenn A. May, *Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), a finely crafted regional study with important implications for a broader understanding of the U.S. role in the Philippines; Norman G. Owen, "Winding Down the War in Albay, 1900-1903," *Pacific Historical Review* 48 (November 1979): 557-89, another revealing regional study; Ken De Bevoise, *Agents of Apocalypse: Epidemic Disease in the Colonial Philippines* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), important in setting American intervention in the context of a broad health crisis; May, *Social Engineering and the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980); Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams," in *Discrepant Histories: Translocal Essays on Filipino Culture*, ed. Vicente L. Rafael (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 3-47, which deftly sets recent developments in perspective.
9. Joseph W. Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Michael H. Hunt, "The Forgotten Occupation: Peking, 1900-1901," *Pacific Historical Review* 48 (November 1979): 501-529.
10. This argument first appeared in Mary C. Wright, "The Rising Tide of Change," in *China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913*, ed. Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 1-63; and receives further development in Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), chaps. 2 and 3.
11. See Fred W. Drake, *China Charts the World: Hsu Chiyü and His Geography of 1848* (Cambridge: Harvard East Asian Research Center, 1975); Michael H. Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), chaps. 2 and 8; and more generally R. David Arkush and Leo O. Lee, eds., *Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
12. For a systematic, authoritative treatment of this transformation, see *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 5, *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially chapters 5 by Jansen, 10 by W. G. Beasley, and 12 by Akira Iriye.
13. Peter Duus, *The Japanese Discovery of America: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford Books, 1997); Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).

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