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OAH Magazine of History
Volume 14, No 3
Spring 2000

Copyright ©
Organization of American Historians

The Chinese Communist Intervention in the Korean War: An Exercise in Analyzing Documents

Michael R. Nichols
Objectives

This exercise seeks to analyze four documents pertaining to the Korean War, in order to assist students preparing for the Document-Based Questions (DBQs) of the College Board Advanced Placement Test. The discussion questions are designed to stimulate students to ask certain questions when examining the documents. The documents in this lesson plan allow students to see how the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) all perceived the Korean War.

These documents are not meant to represent a DBQ as a whole. Instead, they are designed to get students to analyze documents for their importance so that they can quickly interpret other documents during the Advanced Placement Test. Students should be able to apply these analytic skills to the broader question of the DBQ.

Preparation

In preparing for this exercise, students should be familiar with the causes and course of the Korean War, as well as American foreign policy regarding the Far East and the spread of Communism. They also should familiarize themselves with the publicly stated positions of the Soviet Union and China regarding the Korean War. The instructor should make copies of the four documents accompanying this article and hand them out to students. The handouts will form the basis of a discussion, while the following questions will serve as a guide.

Discussion Questions

  1. Who wrote the document? The author is not always easy to distinguish. Document C is a transcript of a meeting between President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur. However, MacArthur’s words form the majority of this document. In Document A, the author is Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, but he has assumed the code name of Filippov.
  2. Who is the writer addressing? The first two documents are clearly addressed to specific individuals. In Document C, MacArthur is addressing Truman. In Document D, MacArthur is reporting to the United Nations Security Council, which is important in explaining how he frames his report.
  3. What is the subject of the writing? In all four documents, the writers discuss the entry of the People’s Republic of China into the Korean War.
  4. What is the writer’s predisposition to the subject? In handling this question, students should be familiar with the language of the Cold War. For instance, in Document B, Mao Zedong refers to the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korean) Army as a “puppet army.” Students should also be aware of General MacArthur’s history as commander-in-chief of the United Nations Forces in Korea, including his later problems with President Truman.
  5. What prompted the writer to write the document? In each document, the reason for writing is clearly stated at the beginning.
  6. What is the writer’s objective? This question should be simple to discern in these documents.
  7. What is the document’s importance? This question is the most important and relies on the student’s knowledge of the subject. In Document A, Stalin clearly shows his involvement in the Chinese Communist decision to intervene—something that was not entirely clear to others at the time. In Document C, MacArthur demonstrates his lack of foreknowledge of the eventual Chinese invasion and his certain belief that the Chinese would not invade.

Documents

All documents appear in Spencer C. Tucker, ed. Encyclopedia of the Korean War (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, forthcoming).

Document A
1 October 1950
Telegram from Filippov (Joseph Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai

I am far away from Moscow on vacation and somewhat detached from events in Korea. However, judging by the information that I have received from Moscow today, I see that the situation of our Korean friends is getting desperate. I think that if in the current situation you consider it possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your troops. The Chinese divisions could be considered as volunteers, with Chinese in command at the head, of course.

Document B
13 October 1950
Telegram from Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai

1. After discussion with comrades on the Politburo, we have reached a consensus that the entry of our army into Korea continues to be to our advantage. In the first phase, we can only fight the puppet [Republic of Korea] army. With a certainty of success in dealing with the puppet army, we can establish a base in the large mountain area to the north of the Wonsan-Pyongyang line and thus encourage the Korean people. The Korean situation would change to our advantage if we could wipe out several divisions of the puppet army in the first phase. 2. The adoption of our active policy mentioned above is extremely favorable to China, Korea, the East, and the world. If we do not send troops [to Korea], the reactionaries at home and abroad will be swollen with arrogance when the enemy troops press to the Yalu River border. Consequently, it will be unfavorable to various parties and especially unfavorable to Northeast China. [In such a situation,] the entire Northeast Frontier Force will be tied down and the power supplies in South Manchuria will be controlled [by hostile parties]. In short, we hold that we should enter the war. We must enter the war. Entering the war is greatly to our advantage; it is greatly to our disadvantage if we do not enter the war.

Document C
15 October 1950
The Truman-MacArthur Wake Island Conference [Excerpts]

THE PRESIDENT: What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference? GENERAL MACARTHUR: Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100/125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50/60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no air force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter. With the Russians it is a little different....They are probably no match for our Air Force. The Russians have no ground troops available for North Korea....The only other combination would be Russian air support for Chinese ground troops....[T]he Chinese ground would be so flimsy that I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us....I believe it just wouldn’t work with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air....

Document D
6 November 1950
Communiqué by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command

The military position of the United Nations forces in the western sector of North Korea is now sufficiently stabilized and information on enemy unit identifications adequately evaluated to permit me to put the situation growing out of the last few days’ operations in proper perspective. The Korean war was brought to a practical end with the closing of the trap on enemy elements north of Pyongyang and seizure of the east coastal area.... The defeat of the North Koreans and destruction of their armies was thereby decisive. In the face of this victory of United Nations arms, the Communists committed one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record by moving without any notice of belligerency elements of alien Communist forces across the Yalu River into North Korea and massing a great concentration of possible reinforcing divisions with adequate supply behind the privileged sanctuary of the adjacent Manchurian border. A possible trap was thereby surreptitiously laid, calculated to encompass the destruction of the United Nations forces engaged in restoring order and the processes of civil government in the North Korean border area. This potential danger was avoided with minimum losses only by the timely detection and skillful maneuvering of the United Nations commander responsible for that sector who, with great perspicacity and skill, completely revised the movement of his forces in order to achieve the greater integration of tactical power necessitated by the new situation, and avert any possibility of a great military reverse. The present situation, therefore, is this: While the North Korean forces with which we were initially engaged have been destroyed or rendered impotent for military action, a new and fresh army now faces us, backed up by a possibility of large alien reserves, and adequate supply within easy reach to the enemy but beyond the limits of our present sphere of military action. Whether and to what extent these reserves will be moved forward to reinforce units now committed remains to be seen and is a matter of the gravest international significance. Our present mission is limited to the destruction of those forces now arrayed against us in North Korea, with a view to achieving the United Nations’ objective to bring unity and peace to the Korean nation and people.

Michael R. Nichols is an assistant professor of history at Tarrant County College in Fort Worth, Texas. He is an associate editor of The Encyclopedia of the Korean War (to be released in June 2000 by ABC-CLIO), having primarily worked on its documents volume.